The Gross Upward Pricing Pressure Index — the intuition, the algebra, the sensitivities, and the numbers regulators have actually used.
The value of sales diverted to the merger partner, expressed as a share of the revenue lost on product 1.
Pre-merger, firm 1's price satisfies its own first-order condition. Customers who walk away when it raises price are simply gone — where they go is irrelevant to firm 1's profit. Post-merger, some of those customers walk into the merger partner's shop. Their business is no longer lost; it is recaptured at the partner's margin.
That recapture acts like a new opportunity cost of selling product 1 — every unit sold at the old price forgoes profitable diversion to product 2. GUPPI measures the size of that opportunity cost, scaled by product 1's price. It is gross: no efficiencies, no rival responses, no pass-through — just the raw incentive.
Firm 1 nudges its price up and these {{ nDots }} customers walk. Click each one to send them to the merger partner, an outside rival, or out of the market. Only the first group matters for GUPPI.
Everything GUPPI needs is measurable: a diversion ratio (from surveys, switching data, or share proportionality), the partner's price–cost margin, and relative prices. Drag the sliders.
Of every £1.00 of product-1 sales given up, £{{ divRev }} reappears as product-2 revenue, earning £{{ divProfit }} of margin — a {{ gStr }}% tax-like credit on cutting product-1 output.
Six steps, no shortcuts. Differentiated Bertrand, single-product firms 1 and 2, constant marginal costs.
GUPPI is bilinear in its two contested inputs, so screening thresholds are hyperbolas: a high-margin industry hits any given level at low diversion. Hover to read the surface (p₂ = p₁).
Three standard refinements. The first two update live — the sliders below are the same D₁₂ and m₂ as the calculator, plus each card's own controls.
The marginal-cost saving that exactly offsets the upward pressure (symmetric Bertrand, Werden 1996):
GUPPI is a cost shock in disguise, so the first-order price effect is GUPPI × pass-through. Linear demand gives ½; log-concavity less, iso-elastic more.
Moresi & Salop (2013) rebuild the logic for vertical mergers: vGUPPIu scores the upstream unit's incentive to raise input prices to downstream rivals; vGUPPIr the resulting rival cost pass-through; vGUPPId the downstream unit's own softened pricing. Same engine — diversion × margin — routed through the input market.
The CMA used GUPPI as a local decision rule across hundreds of overlap areas, with SLC thresholds of 2.75% for supermarkets and 3.25% for convenience stores — after crediting efficiencies. Nationally weighted GUPPIs: 2.5% (Sainsbury's) and 3.3% (Asda).
Earlier UK retail cases drew intervention lines at markedly higher GUPPI levels — roughly 5–10% — making the Sainsbury's/Asda thresholds a step-change in stringency.
The first US litigated merger in which a court engaged seriously with upward-pricing-pressure evidence, a year after diversion-and-margin logic entered the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines as "the value of diverted sales."